Augustine uses the term voluntas for dispositional and occurrent forms of hormê of a rational being, hormê being the Stoic concept of 'impulse' toward action.
not provide a clear statement of what he takes "will" to mean. Thus the same instance of "will" in one of Augustine's texts is called both "impulse" and an "impulsive tendency;" 3 he elsewhere refers to "the will as the motor of impulses," 4 and at other times seems to think of voluntas as a faculty of consent which generates impulse, or a capacity for impulse that is activated consequent to consent. 5 Others have asserted that Augustine's voluntas owes much to Stoicism or to the notion of hormê. They have not, however, unreservedly identified voluntas as a translation for this Stoic concept, provided detailed textual demonstrations for their claims, or reserved it, in every case, for impulse which is rational. Thus Rist has said that Augustine was influenced by Seneca, who used voluntas for hormê, but, he continues, Augustine's voluntas is a philosophical alternative to Stoic hormê because Augustine enriched the Stoic theory by introducing the Platonic element of erôs. 6 Gauthier has asserted that of the traits of the "will" which are found in Augustine, all were already present in the Stoics; but Gauthier does not see voluntas as a term specifically for the hormê of a rational being. 7 Holte and Bochet are notable examples of scholars writing prior to the publication of Inwood's 1985 book on Stoic action theory; 8 apparently they did not have enough information about hormê to recognize it in Augustine. In 1962 Holte identified Augustine's appetitus with Stoic hormê, which he defined simply as a natural tendency; he also made the separate observation that Augustine used voluntas to refer to "conscious impulse giving rise to action." 9 Because he did not realize that Stoic hormê, as a tendency or disposition, tends toward action, nor that the Stoics spoke of an occurrent sense of hormê as well as a dispositional sense, he did not see that Augustine's voluntas was the same as hormê. In 1982, Bochet similarly identified appetitus with hormê, but actually asserted that for the Stoic hormê is a natural tendency without a specific orientation toward action. 10 Thus although she noticed both occurrent and dispositional uses of voluntas in Augustine, 11 noticed that voluntas in Augustine pertains to action, and also noticed that appetitus had both a dispositional and occurrent sense, 12 she failed to identify voluntas either with appetitus or with hormê.
A third group has asserted a vague connection between Augustine's voluntas and inclination or action; but their statements have not attempted to grapple with the question of historical precedent for Augustine's usage. Thus Augustine's voluntas has been described as "a qualified tendency, mental attitude, lasting wish . . . an inclination of the will" and "a volition, a specific act of will," 13 a movement of the soul tending to acquire or reject some object, 14 and a word "which cover[s] 'choose,' 'want, 'wish,' and 'be willing.'" 15 More recently it has simply been noted that Augustine uses voluntas in connection with facere. 16 Least convincingly of all, it has been asserted that Augustine invented the modern notion of the will, which was not derived from earlier doctrines in philosophical psychology, 17 or that Augustine began but did not complete the task of working out a Christian theory of the will that is in fundamental contrast to classical Greek thought. 18 The texts do not bear this out.
Some Texts
Augustine explicitly mentions the Stoic concept hormê in book nineteen of the De Civitate Dei, where he tentatively translates it by impetus vel appetitus actionis. 19 We see that he understands it as an impulse which does not need reason in order to effect action, but which does reflect rationality in a healthy human who is beyond the age of reason: "the insane say or do many absurd things that are for the most part alien to their own aims and characters . . . hormê . . . is included among the primary goods of nature-is it not responsible for those pitiable movements and actions (facta) of the insane that shock us, when sensation is distraught and reason is asleep?"
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When he wants to refer specifically to the hormai of rational beings, he uses voluntates. There is a heretofore overlooked "proof text" for this claim in De Civitate Dei 5.9, which clearly shows that by voluntas Augustine means efficient cause of action, and that he thinks its proper sense is restricted to rational beings, although it may be used for the hormê/motus of animals in an analogous sense. It runs as follows:
Human wills are the causes of human deeds . . . voluntary causes [in general] belong to God, or angels, or men, or animals-if those motûs of animals lacking reason, by which they do anything in accord with their nature, when they either pursue or avoid some thing, are nevertheless to be called voluntates. Moreover, as we are about to see, Augustine follows the Stoics in understanding impulse as having two forms: occurrent and dispositional. 22 According to Augustine, each form has a corresponding object. An occurrent impulse is directed toward performing some particular action concerned with the attainment or avoidance of one intentional object. A dispositional impulse is directed toward the set of actions by which one pursues the members of a kind of object, that is, of an entire class of objects. Rational impulse comes in both of these forms.
21

Studies in Later Greek
There is also scattered evidence that Augustine knew and was inluenced by the Stoics' account of a particluar kind of dispositional hormê-'primary impulse' toward self-preservation (protêhormê), which the Stoics asserted was present in all animals. 23 We 
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Books twelve and fourteen of the De Civitate Dei are of the utmost importance because, with the exception of sections of book eight of the Confessiones, no part of Augustine's corpus is as thick with references to voluntas. Moreover, they provide the key to unlocking Augustine's meaning in not only book eight of the Confessiones, but the rest of his corpus as well. We need not be concerned here with the ostensibly 'theological' context, which describes the original sins of the fallen angels and of Adam and Eve. 25 the only important features of the context are that, as we have already seen, Augustine included angels as well as humans in the category "rational," and that by "sin" (peccatum) he meant an evil (internal or external) act.
In book twelve Augustine tries to account for sinful occurrent appetitus, 26 which for the time being I shall transliterate as 'appetite' so as not to beg the question of whether it is indeed Stoic 'impulse.' He assumes that they must arise out of (ex eo esse) preceding states of the soul-either the soul's nature 27 or an affectio, an accidental state of the soul by which it happens to be qualified prior to the receipt of an impression (visum). 28 Since the appetites in question are sinful, he reasons that they cannot have their source in the natures of souls as created (which must be good, since created by God). Their sources must be acquired dispositions. He calls these dispositional roots of occurrent appetite voluntates or cupiditates:
It is not permissible to doubt that the contrary appetitus of the good and bad angels arose not from differences in their original natures, since God, the good author and creator of all forms of being, created both classes, but from their respective voluntates and cupiditates.
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Augustine here plays on the word voluntas as a translation of boulêsis, one of the constantiae/eupatheiai predicated of the Stoic sage, 30 in order to heighten the contrast between the good and bad angels, emphasizing the depravity of the demons by means of the more lurid "cupiditas." 31 The voluntas of the good angels is persistent, holy, and tranquil; 32 the cupiditas of the demons is arrogant, deceitful, envious-in a word, it is "impure."
33 Yet the impure cupiditas of the demons is also persistent; 34 it is a disposition.
In the surrounding text, however, this cupiditas also goes by the name of voluntas. He identifies the demons' cupiditas with voluntas perversa, 35 using voluntas for a vicious condition of the soul (e.g. civ.Dei 11.17: vitium malitiae . . . voluntas mala). 36 Elsewhere, too, voluntas is applied to bad, as well as good, dispositions from which occurrent appetites arise. 37 Thus Augustine consistently retains the sense of disposition and constancy that the word voluntas has in Cicero's use of it for Stoic boulêsis, but frequently drops the association with virtue, only capitalizing on that association when he wants to contrast the demons with the angels. The association is not a constant or even a typical feature of his use of the word voluntas.
Augustine describes these dispositional voluntates or cupiditates as orientations toward types of objects. The two societies of angels are mirrored in the two "cities" of men on earth; the bad human society is comprised of subgroups, with each group "pursuing the advantages and cupiditates peculiar to itself."
38 Thus we are dealing with dispositions to pursue classes of objects.
While occurrent appetites arise out of comparably stable states, these states themselves result from an interior act of the rational soul. In the case of the demons, Augustine calls this the act of "turning away" (conversio) from the object of their previous, good will. 39 The first vicious disposition arose in these angels because they "sank," by a "spontaneous lapse," from their glorious state into a vitiated state; this lapse was a discrete psychic event in which they began to prefer a new class of goods. 40 Similar to this account is the description of Adam and Eve's original sin in book fourteen. In order to explain an occurrence (in this case, an external act rather than an appetitus), Augustine again posits a preceding disposition. He assumes that there must have been a foregoing vicious state of soul, which he again calls a voluntas (praecessisset voluntas mala), 41 in order to explain how Adam and Eve's performance of the evil deed, eating from the forbidden tree, could have occurred. The contrast he invokes is clearly one between doing and being: "the evil act (opus), i.e., the transgression involving their eating the forbidden fruit, was committed by those who were already bad. For only a bad tree [disposition] could have produced that evil fruit [the deed]." 42 As in the case of the angels, this disposition is also said to have originated occurrently. The bad tree is a "voluntas which had grown dark and cold," a vitiation of the original nature of man. 43 This voluntas mala had its beginning (initium) in an act of "defection" from or "desertion" of the good sought beforehand. 44 The defection was an appetitus for selfexaltation. 45 It is clear throughout both of these books, and throughout his corpus, that Augustine thinks the original sins of the angels and humans were essentially the same: a turning away from God by rational creatures, through pride. Thus the "turning away" (conversio) of the good angels who became bad is the same sort of psychic event as the "defection"-i.e., appetitus-of the human pair who also fell away. Thus in both cases, an occurrent appetite preceded and caused a dispositional will (appetitus ➝ voluntas). The case of Adam and Eve now differs from that of the demons only insofar as it seems to jump from a dispositional voluntas to an external action (voluntas ➝ opus), whereas the demons' disposition was said to yield occurrent appetite (voluntas ➝ appetitus). However, if Augustine holds that an occurrent appetite is necessary for the doing of any external deed, we will need to insert an appetitus between the humans' disposition (voluntas) and act (opus). Then the psychological progression would be the same for the human pair as for the demons, up until the point of the opus which completes the series (appetitus ➝ voluntas ➝ appetitus➝ opus). In fact, there is every reason to think that Augustine would insert an appetitus here. He constantly describes action as effected by a preceding appetitus actionis.
46 Thus the psychology of action operating in the human pair should indeed be described as:
What is most interesting, however, is that the first and third elements in this sequence also go by another name: voluntas. Augustine repeatedly refers to the efficient cause of an action (the third element) as a voluntas (most explicitly, mala voluntas causa efficiens est operis mali, civ.Dei 12.6) when speaking of the demons. 47 He also refers to the initial turning away or defection (the first appetitus in the series) as a voluntas: "the first evil voluntas . . . was a falling away (defectus)." 48 In other words, we find the following:
An orientation toward action runs through the whole of this psychological sequence. The third voluntas in the series is a causa efficiens operis, also known as appetitus actionis, as we have already seen. The first voluntas is as well, for Augustine says that this occurrent voluntas, the appetitus for perverse self-exaltation which was the defection, was "a falling away from the work (opere) of God to the will's own works (opera)." 49 And as shown earlier, the dispositional voluntas, or second item in the series, is a disposition toward pursuing (sectari) goods of the class toward which one is oriented. Thus occurrent and dispositional voluntates are, for Augustine, occurrent and dispositional forms of appetitus actionis.
Since Augustine translates the Greek hormê by appetitus actionis, and since the Stoics spoke of both an active and a dispositional form of hormê, it is quite reasonable to conclude that in these texts he is using voluntas as a translation for Stoic hormê.
Confessiones VIII
Turning to Confessiones book eight, we find confirmation of our theory, and discover additional Stoic features of his usage. When he famously describes how he was divided between "voluntates," 50 also called "parts of voluntas," he relies on the concept of dispositional hormê. He recounts:
My two wills . . . were in conflict with one another, and their discord robbed my soul of all concentration.
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So there are two wills. Neither of them is complete, and what is present in the one is lacking to the other.
52
A will half-wounded, struggling with one part rising up and another part falling down . . .
53
These wills or 'parts' of will are dispositions to pursue distinct classes of goods, and have been formed by habitual actions, as he says: "my two voluntates, one old, the other new . . . were in conflict with one another. . . . I was split between them. . . . But I was responsible for the fact that habit (consuetudo) had become so embattled against me."
54 One "will" tends toward a Voluntates are also occurrent impulses toward particular acts in this book. Augustine indicates that the repeated actions which had built up his dispositional voluntates had each been preceded by the occurent willing of individual actions: "I was responsible for the fact that habit (consuetudo) had become so embattled against me, since it was [ Again, the wills are good when one is deliberating whether "to take delight in a reading from the apostle . . . to take delight in a sober psalm . . . [or] to discourse upon the gospel." 60 Augustine makes explicit that these wills, or occurrent impulses to act, are each aimed at attaining one intentional object: "They tear the mind apart by their mutual incompatibility-four or more wills, according to the number of things desired." 
De Libero Arbitrio, De Genesi ad Litteram IX, and De Civitate Dei V
Finally, Stoic action theory and epistemology helps to clarify the meaning of Augustinian "free will," the phrase often used to translate Augustine's arbitrium voluntatis, liberum arbitrium voluntatis, and libera voluntas. It is evident that he does not mean by these terms to refer to a faculty of uncaused willing, since he agrees with the Stoics that every event has an efficient cause.
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And he does not usually use them to refer to a faculty, although there are occasions when libera voluntas and voluntas are described as a faculty, as we shall see.
a. (Liberum) Arbitrium Voluntatis
We begin with the phrase arbitrium voluntatis. The Stoics asserted that human impulse is preceded by assent to a passively received hormetic impression. 63 They contrasted this with the case of non-rational animals, which lack the power of assent; 64 in these, impulse simply follows such impressions. If Augustine is deeply indebted to Stoicism for his notion of voluntas, we would expect that when he uses the phrase arbitrium voluntatis he is being somewhat redundant, using arbitrium to stipulate in what way voluntas is specifically rational hormê-namely that it is hormê which follows on assent (choice, arbitrium). Augustine might feel the need to spell this out, given that we have seen him allowing the term voluntas to be used of irrational impulse in an extended, non-technical sense. 65 Voluntatis, then, would be an objective genitive stipulating that the kind of assent in question is assent to a hormetic impression, which yields impulse. In this sense, one's having a will is one's own responsibility and is chosen, though not directly so, since the object of assent is the impression.
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Our expectation is met in a number of texts. In De Genesi ad Litteram 9.14.25, while making epistemological claims that clearly show his debt to Stoicism, Augustine interchanges arbitrium with iudicium and associates these with voluntas in order to distinguish the impulse of rational beings from that of any living creature, which he calls appetitus: Since the judgment (iudicium) referred to is identified as consent (consentire) or refusal of consent to an impression, we know that the "choice" (arbitrium) which is given as its synonym is a choice between the options of mentally asserting that the impression is accurate, or asserting that it is false. If all future events are foreknown . . . the order of causes is fixed (certus est ordo causarum). . . . If this is the case, there is nothing really in our power, and there is no rational impulse (nihil est in nostra potestate nullumque est arbitrium voluntatis). And if we grant this, says Cicero, the whole basis of human life is overthrown: it is in vain that laws are made, that men employ reprimands and praise. . . and there is no justice in a system of rewards for the good and punishment for the bad.
This phrase arbitrium voluntatis also occurs in
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The phrase arbitrium voluntatis is Augustine's addition to Cicero's text; he gives it as a synonym for Cicero's phrase in nostra potestate (eph'hêmin). It becomes clear that Augustine understands the voluntas in this phrase to 67. "Omnis enim anima viva, non solum rationalis, sicut in hominibus, verum etiam irrationalis, sicut in pecoribus, et volatilibus, et piscibus, visis movetur. Sed anima rationalis voluntatis arbitrio vel consentit visis, vel non consentit: irrationalis autem non habet hoc iudicium; pro suo tamen genere atque natura viso aliquo tacta propellitur. Nec in potestate ullius animae est, quae illi visa veniant, sive in sensum corporis, sive in ipsum spiritum interius: quibus visis appetitus moveatur cuiuslibet animantis." My trans. 68. Attributed to the veteres. See De Fato (hereafter DF) 40. 69. Civ.Dei 5.9: "Si praescita sunt omnia futura . . . certus est ordo causarum. . . . Wuod si ita est, nihil est in nostra potestate nullumque est in arbitrium voluntatis; quod si concedimus, inquit, omnis humana vita subvertitur, frustra leges dantur, frustra obiurgationes laudes . . . nequw ulla iustitia bonis praemia et malis supplicia constituta sunt." Trans. adapted from Green.
mean hormê/appetitus, and that arbitrium is a reference to assent, when we consider the original passage from De Fato 40 which he is summarizing. It says: If an impression received from the outside is the cause of impulse (appetitus), assent (assensio) or action (actio), then these are not in our power (in nostra potestate), in which case there is no justice in rewards and punishments. 70 Thus Augustine intends to sum up in one phrase (nihil est in nostra potestate nullumque est arbitrium voluntatis) the linkage between concepts (appetitus, assensio, and in nostra potestate) that Cicero establishes over the course of two sentences.
In the following paragraphs of De Civitate Dei 5.9, Augustine repeatedly interchanges this voluntatis arbitrium with other phrases. One of these is liberum voluntatis arbitrium, where liberum seems to be applied for emphasis, the idea being that since assent is by definition a choice between options (to approve or not approve an impression), it is therefore necessarily 'free.' 71 Augustine goes on to describe voluntas itself as "in our power" rather than "necessary"-i.e., to assert that it is free: "If the term 'necessity' should be used of what is not in our power (non est in nostra potestate), but accomplishes its end even against our will (etiamsi nolimus), for example, the necessity of death, then it is clear that our wills (voluntates nostras), by which we live rightly or wrongly, are not under such necessity." 72 The basis for this truism is the fact that arbitrium precedes human impulse;
73 it makes human impulse by definition "free" or "in our power."
When Augustine defends the justice of God's punishments in the De Libero Arbitrio, he also associates voluntas with liberum arbitrium, and again Stoic epistemology and action-theory are at work. Voluntas is said to be a necessary condition for acts to be evaluated morally-"no action would be either a sin or a good deed which was not done voluntate" 74 The first man could have sinned even if he were created wise; and since that sin would have been a matter of free choice (quod peccatum cum esset in libero arbitrio), it would have been justly punished in accordance with divine law. . . . The transitions between wisdom and folly never take place except through will (numquam nisi per voluntate), and for this reason they are followed by just retribution.
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Augustine goes on to explain why he has interchanged these two. Voluntas is impulse rooted in the rational capacity of assent to impressions: Plainly voluntas is here a rational being's impulse toward action, and to be rational is to have the capacity to yield or not yield to impressions. As was the case in the De Civitate Dei, this capacity is what prevents humans from being necessitated; and by it God's justice in punishing human actions is saved. The voluntary movement of soul (motus animi) by which all sin occurs is in our power because it includes rejection or approbation of impressions; 78 voluntas is "turned by motus," 85 and when people turn libera voluntas toward inferior things, they appetunt those inferior things. 86 Given that voluntas and libera voluntas are interchanged, the libera again seems to have been employed for emphasis.
What is distinctive and non-Stoic about the phrase libera voluntas in the De Libero Arbitrio is that it is sometimes used for a faculty (facultas) or power (potentia) of the rational soul (animi) 87 -something given to man by the creator, 88 which remains in us 89 regardless of whether we use it well or badly. 90 Occasionally this capacity is also simply called voluntas. Thus we find:
Libera voluntas is a good, since no one can live rightly without it. . . . The powers of the soul, without which one cannot live rightly, are intermediate goods. . . . Voluntas itself is only an intermediate good. But when voluntas turns away from the unchangeable and common good toward its own private good, or toward external or inferior things, it sins. . . . Hence the goods that are pursued by sinners are in no way evil things, and neither is libera voluntas itself, which we found is to be counted among the intermediate goods. 91 This usage of voluntas libera for a faculty is not common in Augustine's corpus, though it is repeated as late as the De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio (in 426): "We always have free will, but it is not always good. . . . Our ability [to will] is useful when we will [rightly] ." 92 The use of voluntas alone for this faculty is even rarer; it is limited, I believe, to the passage just cited from De Libero Arbitrio, where it is interchanged with libera voluntas. In such cases, he is using voluntas and voluntas libera as shorthand ways of referring to the capacity for having impulse that follows on assent; this reduces to the capacity for assent, since assent is the distinguishing characteristic. Thus we are not dealing with a 'voluntarist' faculty, in the sense of a capacity for a-rational action, but a rational faculty of judgment or assent to impressions.
The Question of Augustine's Sources
As we have seen, by voluntas Augustine does not mean the virtuous person's 'good emotion' of reasonable desire (desire for real goods, viz. the virtues), despite the fact that Cicero uses the word as a translation for this Stoic eupatheia in the Tusculanae. Augustine uses voluntas for human horm generally, and considered apart from affective feelings. Who, then, was Augustine's historical source for this usage?
Certainly another text of Cicero, the De Fato, is important. Voluntas is clearly used for impulse in De Fato 5.9, when it is paired with appetitio, and associated with action: "to sit and to walk and to do some thing."
93 Later (when summarizing Carneades 94 ), Cicero exchanges the word voluntas for "voluntary impulse of the rational soul" (motus animi voluntarius); 95 thus again we see that he intends this word to refer to a specific kind of impulse-rational impulse. Cicero also speaks of libera voluntas. He indicates that this freedom is due to man's rational capacity to assent, contrasting it with necessitas fati and appropriating it to the mind (mens). 96 Moreover he presents the question of whether any action is "of will" (voluntatis) as identical to the questions (a) whether anything is in our power (in nostra potestate), and (b) whether assent (assensio) is in our power. 97 The association of these concepts is precisely what we found in Augustine.
Seneca is another likely source. If Rist is correct that Seneca used the word voluntas for hormê, then the suggestion that Augustine's notion of "will" was influenced by Seneca must also be right; 98 for it is clear that Augustine knew Seneca's moral treatises well and used at least some of them throughout his life.
99
Other possible sources, unverifiable because inextant, include the first book of the De Fato, which was devoted to assent, 100 handbooks of Greek philosophical texts (in Latin translation) which Augustine is believed to have owned, 101 and Varro's De Philosophia, which Augustine is summarizing just prior to mentioning hormê in the De Civitate Dei. 
